Irreplaceability and Unique Value by Grau, Christopher
PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS
VOL. 32, NOS. 1 & 2
Irreplaceability and Unique Value
Christopher Grau
Florida International University
“The Missyplicity Project” is the name of a 2.3-million-dollar research proj-
ect being undertaken at the University of Texas in the hopes of successfully
cloning a dog named “Missy.” The wealthy owners of this dog, who wish to
remain anonymous, acknowledge that the cloned dog will not be Missy, but
they seem to think that she will be the next best thing. The explicit goal of the
project is to come as close as possible to creating an exact duplicate of Missy,
so that after Missy has passed on they can continue to love what was so lov-
able about Missy as manifested in this new dog.1
Both the family that owns Missy and the University of Texas have come
under attack for pursuing Missyplicity. The attacks have been varied but in
general they come in two distinct (though related) varieties: (1) The family
is being excessively sentimental in their attachment to a particular pet and
they should simply “get over it.” (2) The money being devoted to the project
is being foolishly spent when it could instead be used to support animal shel-
ters, research into prevention of animal diseases, or countless other projects
that would clearly benefit animals and/or humans.
I am inclined to agree with the second kind of criticism, but I object to
the first, though I suspect for reasons that Missy’s family would not share.
Rather than this being a case of excessive sentimentality, it seems to me that
part of what makes the Missyplicity project problematic is that the owners of
Missy aren’t being nearly sentimental enough in their attachment to Missy.
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Indeed, there is an important sense in which they arguably aren’t attached to
Missy at all. After all, everyone involved agrees that Missy is not going to con-
tinue living as a result of this project. What will possibly be achieved is the
creation of a duplicate of Missy who will share Missy’s physical and behav-
ioral characteristics.
If Missy were capable of understanding the Missyplicity project and also
capable of communicating her opinion on the matter, it is entirely under-
standable that she might well bark out a fierce objection to the whole affair.
Her response might go something like this:
Look people, I don’t doubt that you (in a sense) care for me and
wish me well. I appreciate the wonderful treatment I’ve received
over the years and I know you will be saddened when in fact I do
reach the end of my life. However, this project to clone me is at
best somewhat misguided and at worst horribly creepy. While it
is difficult (especially for me) to put into words exactly what is so
objectionable about the whole thing, part of what bothers me is
that it raises the suspicion that you haven’t really loved me all
these years after all. Sure, you loved my shiny coat, my playful dis-
position, and even my stubborn refusal to come when called, but
loving all these characteristics of mine isn’t the same as truly lov-
ing me. If your love could be so easily transferred to another dog
with the same characteristics, I can’t help but feel that there is a
way in which I am not being appreciated as an individual, but
simply as a creature that happens to possess those dog properties
that you really care about.
While I can’t blame you for liking my properties, as I’m
pretty fond of them myself, I do feel that somehow something
has been left behind in your love. Namely, me, Missy. I am not
simply a collection of properties. After all, I’ve changed over the
years, and your love remained, or at least appeared to remain,
constant. I used to have a mangy coat, an annoyingly hyperactive
personality, and a tendency toward incontinence (and I don’t
mean that in the philosophical sense of the term) and yet you
loved me still. Why, then, are you so eager to transfer your love
for me to a duplicate dog who happens to have (if your project is
successful) the same properties I now possess? Can you blame me
for feeling that this will somehow do a disservice to me and my
memory? I may not deserve all the consideration due to a human
being, but I also don’t deserve to be treated like a toaster oven:
i.e., something that can simply be replaced with a functional
equivalent when it ceases to operate. If this is in fact how you
view me, then these critics who charge you with being overly sen-
timental couldn’t be further from the truth!
My suspicion is that many of you will be somewhat skeptical of this line
of argument, but your skepticism probably arises in large part because I have
put it into the mouth of a canine. “Missy is just a dog,” one might object, “and
while the kind of treatment she is demanding does seem appropriate for a
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person, it isn’t so clear that it is appropriate for an animal that lacks the
capacity to reason or (despite the fictional tirade) use language. Perhaps dogs
are in fact closer to toaster ovens than they are to human beings. At any rate,
we need to be shown why this isn’t the case.”
I think this is an objection that can be met, but I won’t pursue that proj-
ect here.2 For now what is important is that the objection grants that Missy’s
tirade is the kind of thing that it does make sense for a person to say—the
vision of love and attachment sketched by Missy is one we can understand
and endorse as applying to persons if not also applying to animals. This is,
for my present purposes, enough.
THE PUZZLE
Several philosophers have commented on the apparently strange fact that in
loving another person we tend to value the other in a way that goes beyond
simply valuing the characteristics that compose the person.
Apparently, love is an interesting instance of another relationship
that is historical, in that (like justice) it depends upon what actu-
ally occurred. An adult may come to love another because of the
other’s characteristics; but it is the other person, and not the
characteristics, that is loved. The love is not transferable to some-
one else with the same characteristics, even to one who “scores”
higher for these characteristics. And the love endures through
changes of the characteristics that gave rise to it. One loves the
particular person one actually encountered. Why love is histori-
cal, attaching to persons in this way and not to characteristics, is
an interesting and puzzling question.3
The unique value we attribute to the beloved cannot be captured by a reduc-
tive analysis of the value of the properties that make up that person. In addi-
tion, we are hesitant to “swap” a loved one for another who possesses
identical properties or even superior properties. The beloved is, in an impor-
tant sense, irreplaceable.
This point seems, to many, to be reasonable enough, but there is a long
and impressive philosophical tradition that challenges the reasonableness of
this sort of attachment. The challenges come in several forms. Some thinkers
argue that we can’t possibly be attaching to what we think we are because
persons are not what we think. Others argue that regardless of what we are
attaching to, we ought to attach differently: philosophical reflection shows us
that we ought to revise our practice. I want to spend some time considering
the views of those skeptical about irreplaceability in order to better under-
stand why this kind of value—this kind of attachment—seems suspect to
many. I think this will ultimately help us get clearer on just what it means to
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value someone or something as irreplaceable, and that will put us in a better
position to classify this kind of value and see how it relates to some of the
other categories of value that philosophers have discussed.
PLATO
Perhaps the earliest philosophical argument that loving another is best
understood as loving qualities or characteristics of the other is to be found in
the writings of Plato. In the Symposium, Socrates finds himself in a contest
with his friends to give a speech on the nature of love. Prior to Socrates’s
speech, Aristophanes tells a mythical tale of the origin of the human race.
According to this tale, there were originally three races, not two. People were
doubled-up, in a sense: they were round—with four arms, four legs, and two
faces. There was a female race, a male race, and one in which an individual
shared both sexes. The story goes that these “globular” early humans were
incredibly strong and proud, and they eventually attempted to “assault the
gods” (190C).4 As punishment, Zeus decided to split each of them into two,
right down the middle, and this resulted in humans coming to take their
present form. According to Aristophanes, then, love is quite literally a search
for our “other half ”—a desire to be reunited with the other human with
whom one was once coupled.
When it is Socrates’s turn to speak, he offers a speech that he says was
given to him by the priestess Diotima. In that speech Diotima argues against
accounts like Aristophanes’s:
“And there is a certain account,” she said, “according to which
those who seek their own halves are lovers. But my speech denies
that eros is of a half or of a whole—unless, comrade, that half or
whole can be presumed to be really good; for human beings are
willing to have their own hands and feet cut off, if their opinion
is that their own are no good. For I suspect that each does not
cleave to his own (unless one calls the good one’s own and belong-
ing to oneself, and the bad alien to oneself) since there is nothing
that human beings love other than the good.” (205E)
The claim here seems to be that other people are valued not in themselves or
for their own sake but for the sake of the good they manifest. In loving
another we don’t actually seek out our “better half ”—we seek those good
qualities that make our “better half” better. It should be understood that the
“good” was a term with a very broad connotation for the Greeks, however,
and in addition Diotima and Socrates appear to allow that many people can
have deeply misguided conceptions of what is, in fact, good. Nonetheless, the
important point for our purposes is that however the good is construed, it is
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what we are actually valuing when we love someone. (If the goodness was
absent, the love would presumably be extinguished.)
Diotima’s claim that humans love only the good is supplemented by a
prescription for the course that proper love must take: one begins by loving
a beautiful body (for eros naturally pursues the good through the beautiful
[206B–C]), but one then eventually realizes that this beauty can be found
elsewhere in similarly attractive persons. This realization brings with it a
slackening of attachment to any one body, and allows the lover to pursue
beauty wherever he can find it. After this, one should come to believe that
“beauty in souls is more honorable than that in the body” and similarly real-
ize that this beauty is also generalizable and should be appreciated wherever
it is found. Finally, one comes to see the beauty of sciences and ultimately
conclude that the most beautiful and thus lovable thing is the idea of good
itself (210A–D). To love properly, on this account, is to follow a path from
loving a particular individual because he is beautiful (and thus good) to com-
ing to love the good directly.
To summarize, people are desirable and lovable because they contain
reflections of the idea of the good, and upon realizing this one can cut out the
“middleman” by cutting out the “man” altogether and going on to love the
good directly. In fact, on the scale one must climb to reach the good, persons
are toward the bottom, for love of them is viewed (by Plato) as less valuable
than love for impersonal abstractions, as scholars such as Gregory Vlastos and
Martha Nussbaum have emphasized in their writings on this topic.5
While it is difficult to know exactly to what extent Plato wanted to
endorse the account of love offered by Diotima, it appears to fit well with
claims that Socrates makes regarding love in other dialogues (such as the
Phaedrus) and it also seems to cohere with his more general claims about the
importance of the good. A more difficult problem is determining to what
extent this account of love is being offered as a descriptive rather than a revi-
sionary account. It seems to include elements of both: Diotima gets Socrates
to agree that “there is nothing that human beings love other than the good”
is a true description of the manner in which eros functions (with the
acknowledgment that often humans fail to perceive the good correctly).
Diotima then goes on to instruct Socrates in the proper path that love ought
to take—one ought to pursue what is truly good, and ultimately one ought
to pursue it as directly as possible.
Though few people in fact pursue the good in the manner prescribed by
Diotima, the thought is that we all ought to strive to follow this path toward
unmediated loving of the pure good. Both the lover of a pretty body and the
more enlightened lover of the idea of the good seem to share one thing in
common from the get-go; however: neither love people in a way that is inde-
pendent of loving the good manifested in the person. People are, on this
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account, simply repositories for the good and beautiful, and to this extent
ultimately replaceable with others who manifest beauty and goodness to an
equal or greater degree. Vlastos has argued that this is a serious flaw in Plato’s
account:
We are to love persons so far, and only insofar, as they are good
and beautiful. Now since all too few human beings are master-
works of excellence, and not even the best of those we have the
chance to love are wholly free of the streaks of the ugly, the mean,
the commonplace, the ridiculous, if our love for them is to be
only for their virtue and beauty, the individual, in the uniqueness
and integrity of his or her individuality, will never be the object
of our love. This seems to me the cardinal flaw in Plato’s theory.
It does not provide for love of whole persons, but only for love of
that abstract version of persons which consists of the complex of
their best qualities.6
Plato has given us an account of the love of persons that can’t help but strike
many readers as disturbing. While Aristophanes’s myth may well be nothing
more than a romantic fantasy, it does seem to capture something crucial that
Diotima’s account does not: it recognizes our deeply felt need to value the
beloved as a unique individual. Plato’s prescription for abstraction fails
entirely to account for or make sense of this need.
Though the impersonal nature of Plato’s account of personal love inclines
many to reject it as erroneous, even his critics acknowledge that this vision of
love is motivated by a powerful idea. Most of us would be inclined to agree
with Plato that if anything is an intrinsically valuable and an unproblemati-
cally justifiable thing to desire and pursue, it is goodness. The notion of per-
sons as possessing some other sort of value can, without much philosophical
prompting, easily come to seem rather mysterious, but it is not difficult to
appreciate that persons can be straightforwardly valued as creatures that
manifest the good in various ways. In explaining our attachment to the other
in terms of an attachment to the good, Plato’s account offers us a way of con-
ceptualizing our love of persons as something reasonable rather than irra-
tional: our love for the other is a natural though inefficient way for human
beings to pursue the good.
So I think most of us can sympathize, at least in part, with Plato’s moti-
vations here. However, most also agree with Vlastos when he complains that
Plato’s account seems to miss the mark—it leaves out something we care
about, namely the person, even if it does provide a rationale for what can
seem to be a rather irrational attachment. I want to now look briefly at
another thinker who suspected that there is something dubious going on
when we talk of loving individual persons.
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PASCAL
Many years after Plato, Pascal wrote the following in his Pensees:
What is the self? A man goes to the window to see the people
passing by; if I pass by, can I say he went there to see me? No, for
he is not thinking of me in particular. But what about a person
who loves someone for the sake of her beauty; does he love her?
No, for smallpox, which will destroy beauty without destroying
the person, will put an end to his love for her. And if someone
loves me for my judgment or my memory, do they love me? me,
myself? No, for I could lose these qualities without losing my self.
Where then is this self, if it is neither in the body nor the soul?
And how can one love the body or the soul except for the sake of
such qualities, which are not what makes up the self, since they
are perishable? Would we love the substance of a person’s soul, in
the abstract, whatever qualities might be in it? That is not possi-
ble, and it would be wrong. Therefore we never love anyone, but
only qualities.7
Pascal doesn’t insist with Plato that we must actually be loving the apparently
good or beautiful qualities of a person, but he does seem forced to conclude
that at bottom what we must be loving are qualities of some sort or another.
Pascal is more explicit than Plato regarding just why he comes to this conclu-
sion, and with his help we begin to get a better sense of just why Nozick’s
“puzzling” question about the nature of love is so puzzling. While our natu-
ral inclination is to think that our love for a person is not just a love for the
characteristics of the person, Pascal challenges us to imagine in what else it
could coherently consist. The thought of loving a self independently of any
characteristics or properties of that self seems ludicrous. What kind of love
could that possibly be? If it is even possible to conceptualize a self free of
qualities, why on earth should anyone find anything lovable in that? Our ini-
tial thought that love for another transcends properties comes to seem not
just confused, but ridiculous.
Pascal also points out that his diagnosis (that love must be for qualities)
corresponds with our own experience regarding the limits of love:
He no longer loves the person he loved ten years ago. I quite
believe it: she is not the same any more, nor is he. He was young
and so was she; now she is quite different. Perhaps he would still
love her as she used to be then.8
When enough of the characteristics of a person change, our love also tends
to change or fade. Doesn’t this show, as well as anything could, that what we
were actually attached to were those characteristics?
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We aren’t sure how else to explain our love except in terms of the quali-
ties possessed by the beloved, and similarly when we introspect and consider
what is lovable about ourselves, we are also inclined to explain our own
worth in terms of various properties we possess. To claim to love another for
reasons removed from the other’s characteristics seems absurd; to be told one
is being loved in a way divorced from one’s qualities perplexing.
THE SWAP
Pascal’s points have force, for it isn’t initially obvious what else could qualify
as a coherent object of our love other than the collection of properties that
make up a person. Nevertheless, perhaps caution is in order here. While it is
an open question just what we ought to love when we love a person, Pascal’s
claim that “we never love anyone” seems too strong. Regardless of what it
might make the most sense to love, many of us certainly think we are loving
other persons, and loving them in a way that transcends an appreciation of
their properties. This remains true even if we haven’t the foggiest notion how
to make sense of such an attachment. That this is so can be seen with the help
of a somewhat far-fetched but nonetheless revealing thought-experiment:
Imagine that it is possible to replace a person with another who is exactly
similar. It does not seem likely that such a procedure is physically possible,
but for the sake of argument imagine that we are capable of producing an
exact physical and psychological duplicate of a person. Now, imagine that a
friend you love deeply is going to be transferred to another planet exactly
similar to our own (a la Twin Earth) to pursue the same life-plan she has pur-
sued here on Earth, and with presumably the same degree of success. You,
however, will never again have contact with her. Instead you will find your-
self encountering an exact duplicate who will be placed on Earth to resume
your original friend’s job and other responsibilities. The duplicate who
replaces your friend is not simply a clone with the same genetic makeup—it
is an exact replica of your friend, and one who has been created just prior to
the switch. Upon being told that a close friend will be, for whatever reason,
replaced by such a duplicate, most of us would find this “swap” disturbing.
Something valuable (to you) would seem to be lost in the exchange.9
What are we to make of our reaction to this sort of case? At the very
least, it seems to cast doubt on Pascal’s assertion that all we ever really care
about are qualities. After all, the duplicate will share all of my friend’s quali-
ties, and my sense of loss seems to be fully compatible with an appreciation
of this fact. If one still has doubts that a sense of loss is the appropriate reac-
tion in this kind of case, modify the example such that you are the one who
will be replaced while your friend continues to live on with a duplicate of
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you. How ought your friend react to the news? A lack of concern on the part
of your friend would seem to be a kind of insult, and would raise the suspi-
cion that you were not really being loved to begin with. Whether it is rational
or reasonable, we do often love persons in a manner that can’t simply be
reduced to a love of the qualities that persons possess, and in addition we
expect (or at least hope) to be loved in a similar manner. Accordingly, loved
ones are valued as irreplaceable in a way that Pascal’s account can’t acknowl-
edge. Even if it is true that we ought to only love qualities, it can’t be quite
right that that is all we do love.10 The truth seems closer to the view once
stated by McTaggart, which, though as forcefully blunt as Pascal’s, is other-
wise diametrically opposed: “Love is for the person, and not for his qualities,
nor is it for him in respect of his qualities. It is for him.”11
UNIQUE VALUE
I’m going to refer to the value we accord to something when we are reluctant
to accept a substitution (even an exactly similar substitution) as “unique
value.” (In other words, unique value is the value we attribute to something
when we take it to be irreplaceable in the manner I’ve just discussed.) Now,
as the swap thought experiment is supposed to show, this unique value that
comes with being irreplaceable ought not to be understood as based on the
contingent fact that there is no one else around at the moment who shares all
of one’s qualities, nor should it be seen to be based on the mistaken belief
that such a duplicate is impossible in theory. That the unique value that we
accord to those we care about does not necessarily “hinge” on any such the-
sis is made evident when we consider the fact that upon being convinced that
such a duplication would be possible in theory (or even in fact) it still seems
perfectly plausible for one’s attitude regarding the unique value of persons to
remain entirely unchanged.
The kind of uniqueness or individuality at issue here is not the sort of
thing that could be “hostage to fortune” by being dependent on a possible
empirical discovery (to use a nice phrase employed by David Cockburn when
he talks about this topic).12 Harry Frankfurt also makes this kind of point,
and he discusses an example where he encounters an exact duplicate of his
daughter. He’s not sure what his response would be, but it certainly wouldn’t
involve the conclusion that he has somehow been wrong to love her the way
he did because he mistakenly supposed there was no one quite like her
around.13
It appears that whatever we mean by unique value, we must mean some-
thing other than that kind of “matter of fact” uniqueness. One thing we could
mean is simply that we value the beloved uniquely— we value her in a way
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that embodies the attitude that she is an individual and thus unique, incom-
parable, and irreplaceable. This attitude is not based on any belief about
uniqueness of qualities (in fact or in theory) that could turn out to be false—
it is independent of that kind of consideration.14
METAPHYSICAL VS. NORMATIVE WORRIES
Even after we’ve gotten clearer on just what kind of attachment is involved in
valuing another as irreplaceable, I think the worry still remains for many that
there is something metaphysically incoherent lurking in our thought on this
matter. As Pascal’s comments hint, it appears we face a metaphysical dilemma
in trying to make sense of our attachment. The worry is that we can’t possi-
bly be valuing persons in the way we pre-reflectively think we are: either we
are attaching to a featureless soul (or a bare locus or substratum of some
sort) or we are attaching to a collection of properties which could, in theory,
be repeated in another.
This type of worry is a very natural and pervasive one; if we adopt a
model of the person in which people are taken to be metaphysically bare loci,
or mysterious and imperceptible substrates, then it would appear that only
God (if anyone) could value such creatures. No doubt some have been driven
to such a view by the thought that the only alternative is the view that per-
sons are “nothing but properties,” and thus it must be the abstract properties
that we love and value. Our initial (seemingly innocent) thought that we
attach to an irreplaceable individual comes to appear metaphysically suspect.
If this metaphysical worry is the motivation of skeptics of irreplaceabil-
ity, I want to argue that it is misguided for reasons that Saul Kripke has
offered in Naming and Necessity.
What I do deny is that a particular is nothing but a ‘bundle of qual-
ities’, whatever that may mean. If a quality is an abstract object, a
bundle of qualities is an object of an even greater degree of
abstraction, not a particular. Philosophers have come to the
opposite view through a false dilemma: they have asked, are these
objects behind the bundle of qualities, or is the object nothing
but the bundle? Neither is the case; this table is wooden, brown,
in the room, etc. It has all these properties and is not a thing
without properties, behind them; but it should not therefore be
identified with the set, or ‘bundle’, or its properties, nor with the
subset of its essential properties.15
A particular person, like any particular object, is correctly understood as
something that possesses properties without “lurking behind” those proper-
ties in a problematic manner.
Now, I don’t want to deny that there are many interesting metaphysical
questions and problems here. All I want to do is point out that there isn’t a
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special metaphysical problem regarding the object of our attachment when
we love someone or value something as irreplaceable. I think sometimes peo-
ple think there is a special problem because they get into a kind of type/token
confusion: when thinking about the reasonableness of our attachment, they
feel forced to conclude that we must be valuing an abstraction (a type—a col-
lection of qualities) because the only alternative appears to be that we are
valuing something devoid of properties altogether. The truth is that we are
not valuing a type but a particular token (the individual person—where that
person is best understood as not being a featureless metaphysical mystery but
as made up of a particular instantiation of qualities/properties).
Of course some will point out (rightly, I think) that this clears up a
metaphysical/ontological puzzle only to replace it with a normative puzzle
about the rationality of our attachment: why on earth should we attach to the
particular instantiation rather than the abstract properties themselves? How can
it be reasonable to be so partial in our valuation? It is natural to think that we
must have some reasons for our attachment, and since reasons are by their
nature general such reasons would presumably refer to those qualities of a
person that could, at least theoretically, be repeated in another.16 In other
words, it would seem that in order for my attachment to the beloved to be
rational, there must be some rationale—there must be reasons like “I like her
yellow hair, I like her sense of humor, etc.”—but these reasons, if they are
genuine, must apply to similar cases—they must generalize.
This is indeed a real puzzle, and one that I explore elsewhere.17 (I defend
the view that there are ways in which our attachment is in part unreasoned
and nonrational but not irrational.) For now it will have to suffice to say that
this is a conceptually available option.18 We can have a legitimate concern
over the object of our love without embracing metaphysical mysteries, and
once we see this we need not follow Pascal or more contemporary skeptics in
denying that the focus of love is an individual.
THE VARIETIES OF UNIQUE VALUE
Love’s birth may be based, in part, on the particular qualities of the beloved,
but love’s bond is best understood not as a bond to those qualities, but to the
beloved. Whether it is reasonable or not, many of us attach to particular indi-
viduals in a manner that is at least somewhat independent of the qualities
that draw us to the person in question.
As my introductory comments about Missy suggest, we don’t value only
people as irreplaceable individuals: animals also can be valued in this man-
ner. In addition, there are many objects that are valued as irreplaceable in the
manner I’ve considered. In other words, there are objects that we attach to
such that we are reluctant to accept a substitute, even when that substitute is
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an exact qualitative duplicate. One example of this would be a great painting,
like the Mona Lisa. Most of us would resist a substitute here, and I don’t think
this resistance is simply based on a fear that the duplicate would somehow
fall short or fail to mimic the aesthetic properties of the original adequately.
We want the real deal.
In the example of the Mona Lisa I think our attachment to the original
is intimately connected to an acknowledgment that the original has a partic-
ular history that links it to the original artist, while a duplicate lacks this his-
tory. Elsewhere I explore why it is reasonable (i.e., not irrational) to care
about this history, but here I’m instead going to take it as a given that we do
care about the history—we do grant unique value to persons, animals, and
objects—we value them as irreplaceable in the manner I’ve been considering.
For the rest of this essay I want to explore the nature of this value.
UNIQUE VALUE AND INTRINSIC VALUE
I have been arguing that irreplaceable people and objects possess a kind of
noninstrumental value that is, in fact, revealed in our treatment of them as
irreplaceable. This is what I’m calling “unique value.” Traditionally, intrinsic
value has been opposed to instrumental value, and it is accordingly tempting
to see a connection between intrinsic value and irreplaceability (or unique
value). Christopher Gowans assumes such a connection when he refers to
irreplaceable people as possessing “unique and intrinsic value” and claims
that “a person is not only intrinsically valuable, but has an intrinsic value
which is different from that of everyone else.”19 I now want to explore this
supposed connection between irreplaceability and intrinsic value.
G. E. Moore’s writings on intrinsic value remain influential, so perhaps
it is best to start with him. In his essay “The Conception of Intrinsic Value,”
he wrote:
To say that a kind of value is “intrinsic” means merely that the
question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it pos-
sesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in
question.20
In other words, if an object possesses intrinsic value, it does so in virtue of its
intrinsic properties. (To use contemporary jargon, such value supervenes on
the intrinsic properties of the object.) An intrinsically valuable object, on this
view, cannot derive its intrinsic value from nonintrinsic or relational proper-
ties. It follows from this account that any two objects with the same intrinsic
properties (in the same degree) will accordingly possess the same intrinsic
value:
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if a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain
degree, then not only must the same thing possess it, under all
circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything exactly like
it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same
degree.21
Moore says more about intrinsic value, and some of what he says is very con-
troversial and murky, so for now let’s stick with what I’ll call his “minimal
requirement”: intrinsic value supervenes on intrinsic properties. It is pretty
clear that this is being offered as a necessary (though not sufficient) condi-
tion. To say that something has intrinsic value is to say at least that it has a
value which supervenes on its intrinsic properties.
I have earlier argued that to claim a person (or thing) is irreplaceable and
thus uniquely valuable is to deny that a duplicate with the same intrinsic
properties would possess the same unique value, so if there is a connection
between unique value and intrinsic value it can’t simply be the fact that
unique value just is a species or kind of intrinsic value. Clearly unique value
does not meet Moore’s minimal requirement for intrinsic value: My dupli-
cate and I have the same intrinsic nature (so if we possess intrinsic value at
all, we must possess the same intrinsic value, according to Moore—we can’t
possess different intrinsic value if our intrinsic properties don’t differ), yet we
obviously differ in what I’m calling unique value.
What is going on here? Though the temptation to see unique value as a
species of intrinsic value has numerous sources, I suspect one reason lay in
the tendency of many philosophers to run together the notion of intrinsic
value with the distinct notion of valuing someone (or something) as an end
(or as a final good). Frankena’s standard introductory text Ethics is just one
example of a text in which this confusion occurs:
One may also say that something is good on the ground that it is
a means, necessary, sufficient, or both, to a good end […] Then
it is extrinsically or instrumentally good, or good as a means.
[…] We also sometimes say that things are good, desirable, or
worthwhile in themselves, as ends, intrinsically.22
This is a mistake that, thankfully, has been corrected recently in the literature
by numerous philosophers. Frankfurt, for instance, criticizes Moore for the
same kind of slip:
Moore speaks in one breath of “goods or ends in themselves.” As
though the notion of something being good in itself were freely
interchangeable with the notion of its being an end it itself. It
seems to me that this aspect of his formulation is out of focus.
Whether or not something is good in itself depends exclusively
on its inherent characteristics. On the other hand, whether it is
an end in itself depends upon whether someone adopts it or pur-
sues it.23
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This conflation has been tempting because the two do often go together:
when I value something intrinsically I also often value it as an end. That they
can come apart, however, should be clear. As Korsgaard points out in her
essay “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” the proper contrast with intrinsic
value is not instrumental value but extrinsic value, i.e., value deriving from
outside the object (through relations with other things).24 Once we under-
stand this, we can see how something could be taken to be extrinsically valu-
able and yet valued as an end. This is relevant because at least some cases of
unique value and irreplaceability seem to fit this mold. Consider the example
of a crude drawing given by a child: it seems quite plausible to say that the
drawing might possess little or no intrinsic value, and yet I might nonetheless
value it in a noninstrumental manner (as an end or a “final good” if you don’t
like the term “end” referring to objects) and take it to be irreplaceable.
It appears, then, that the notion that we should be investigating is not
that of intrinsic value but rather that of valuing something as an end.
Following Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, I’m going to
call this sort of value, “final value” to distinguish it from instrumental value
or value as a means.25 (Frankfurt calls it “terminal value” but that term strikes
me as unnecessarily morbid.)
Before I go on to say more about unique value and final value, there is
one clarification that is important: many of the same philosophers who have
pointed out the danger of conflating intrinsic value with final value have also
pointed out that the contrast between valuing something as an end and as a
means is not exclusive. Something might possess both instrumental value
and be valued as an end: Kagan claims that the pen Abraham Lincoln used to
sign the Emancipation Proclamation could be such an object,26 Frankfurt
suggests that an “invigorating workout” (with its “zestful glow of unimpeded
vitality”) is a candidate for both sorts of value,27 while Korsgaard suggests
that a “mink coat” be seen as a case of “mixed” value.28 The distinction is gen-
uine, but not exclusive.
While it seemed a mistake to view unique value as a species of intrinsic
value, it isn’t so obviously mistaken to consider things valued as irreplaceable
as a subclass of the larger class of things valued as ends (things with final
value). One thing we might mean when we refer to something as being valu-
able “for its own sake” or “as an end” is that it is irreplaceable to us. That is
not always what we mean, however: many things that could be said to have
final value are not irreplaceable. Korsgaard at one point talks of an ornately
decorated frying pan possessing final value: while I think we can imagine sit-
uations in which the pan is valued as irreplaceable (e.g., when it has been
given as a gift by a loved one), we can also imagine other cases in which that
particular pan could easily be replaced by a similarly ornate pan.
So it seems there are at least two distinct ways in which one might value
something as an end. Though I am not entirely confident that the notion of
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“intrinsic value” can be made out in a way that is fully coherent, if we stick to
Moore’s minimal condition (supervenience on intrinsic properties) one
might be inclined to think that the two ways of valuing ends can be divided
into valuing something as an end because it is intrinsically valuable (i.e., any
duplicate will possess the same intrinsic value and the same value as a final
end) or valuing something as an end because it is uniquely valuable and thus
irreplaceable. (Another way of putting this: when we value something as an
end, we might be valuing that token as an individual or we might be valuing
the type of which that token is an example. And when we are valuing the type
as an end it is in virtue of its intrinsic properties.)
This distinction, like the one between instrumental value and the value
of final ends, is tricky because it is not exclusive: the beautiful painting by
Picasso is undoubtedly valued as a final end both because of its intrinsic
properties and because of the extrinsic historical properties that ground its
unique value.
Also, this contrast should not be taken to have the implication that all
nonintrinsic value is thus uniquely valuable (in other words, unique value
doesn’t just mean extrinsic value): objects might well be valued extrinsically,
for their relational properties, and yet be utterly replaceable and not plausi-
bly considered candidates for final value (e.g., a dollar bill).
So it looks like unique value, far from being a kind of intrinsic value, is
instead better regarded as a class of final value, the other class consisting of
objects valued as ends based on their intrinsic properties. This initially prom-
ising account of unique value and its relationship to intrinsic value is incor-
rect, however. I said we can carve up final value into two classes: things valued
as ends based on intrinsic value, and things valued as ends based on unique
value. I think that much is right if all we mean by “unique value” is final value
based on extrinsic properties. Then my thesis is straightforwardly true, but
rather uninteresting. From the beginning, however, I’ve tied my notion of
unique value to the idea that something with unique value is irreplaceable. So,
if what we mean by “unique value” is the value we attribute to irreplaceable
objects in virtue of their irreplaceability, then the way I just carved things up
is interesting but false. Here’s why: one can value something on the basis of
its nonintrinsic properties and value it as an end, and yet still be valuing it as
a type (and thus replaceable by other objects of the same type). In other
words, valuing something as an end based on extrinsic properties is not
equivalent to valuing something as irreplaceable. Extrinsically grounded final
value doesn’t equal unique value.
Consider the set of guitars owned by Jimi Hendrix. One might care
about a particular guitar (the one played at Woodstock, for example) but
then again one might not. One might instead value the entire set of guitars he
played, and freely accept a substitute of one guitar for another. (This is a case
where history matters, but several objects share the relevant history.) The
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swap thought experiment alone won’t tell us what someone is valuing in this
kind of situation, as the newly created duplicate fails on both counts—it isn’t
the right token, and it isn’t part of the valued type, so both the lover of the
particular guitar and the lover of the set will reject the new duplicate.
Or consider a diamond ring that was not a gift. Many are not inclined to
accept the artificial duplicate, but this isn’t because they won’t accept any sub-
stitution, it is rather because the duplicate isn’t a member of the valued class.
(This is a case where the origin of the object matters—the duplicate lacks the
proper natural origin, but many other diamonds have the proper origin and
would be acceptable substitutes.)
In fact, I suspect there are quite a few cases, then, where an object can
have final value based on extrinsic features yet not be irreplaceable. My ini-
tial taxonomy was too crude.
So what, then, is my thesis? Well, now, it isn’t quite so tidy, but I still
think it is interesting. This much remains true: Contrary to Gowan’s claim,
unique value is best conceived of as a kind of extrinsic final value, not a type
of intrinsic value. Valuing something as irreplaceable (as possessing unique
value) involves a kind of final value that derives from certain extrinsic or rela-
tional properties of the object. Unique value isn’t the only sort of final value
that derives from extrinsic properties, however: in cases in which more than
one thing can share the relevant extrinsic properties, there can be objects
with final value grounded in extrinsic properties that are still replaceable by
other objects from the relevant class. (Remember again Hendrix’s guitars.
Other examples would include the first print-run of a book or perhaps the
set of Redwoods.)
I’m reserving the term “unique value” for those objects that have rele-
vant extrinsic properties that are not shared by another (like the guitar
Hendrix played at Woodstock [assuming he played just one guitar]). Of
course, one person’s type is another’s token—if you want to consider the class
or set of guitars as an individual unit, then you could say that it is what has
unique value and is irreplaceable. Say what you like, so long as we keep in
mind that this sort of case is distinct from the case where multiple entities are
replaceable with one another because they have the same relevant extrinsic
properties.
In conclusion, then, I’ve tried to show that those philosophers who dis-
tinguished between intrinsic value and final value didn’t quite go far enough.
I’ve argued that there are even more distinctions worth noticing here, and I
think that in general these further distinctions have been overlooked because
the whole category of unique value has, for the most part, been overlooked.
Before ending, some comments regarding the unique value of persons
are in order, since I spent quite a bit of time early on talking about irreplace-
able people. I just said that unique value is a kind of final value reserved for
those things that have particular extrinsic properties that cannot be shared
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by another. In the case of being in love with another person and valuing them
as irreplaceable, I want to argue that it is the particular shared history
between the lover and the beloved that plays this individuating role, and thus
helps to make the lovers truly irreplaceable to each other. No one else can
have that shared history, and accordingly no one else can take the place of the
beloved. Further, I think that much of the importance we place on shared his-
tory can be illuminated through a focus on the role that shared agency plays
in a relationship. This history of agency that two intimates come to share over
time distinguishes each partner while at the same time bonding the couple
together, and a consideration of the individuating aspects of responsible
agency helps us (at least in part) to understand why the possibility of a sub-
stitution or swap comes to look perverse.29 Now, giving a full account of the
relevance of history and the importance of agency for the unique value of
persons (and animals and objects) is a large project that cannot be under-
taken here. I hope, though, that here I’ve at least cleared some ground, so that
we can better understand the (dare I say “unique”?) nature of what I’m call-
ing unique value, and thus better appreciate how this kind of value both
resembles and differs from the other sorts of value that philosophers have
traditionally concerned themselves with.
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